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Summary 
A performance-related pay scheme is a remuneration system whereby the re-
ward for an employee is partly dependent upon its own performance and/or on 
the performance of the organisation. In the Netherlands, performance-related 
pay is being implemented in SMEs an increasing scale. Currently, about 25% of 
Dutch SMEs make use of some kind of performance-related pay scheme, which 
may include profit sharing, bonuses, gratuities and stock options. 
 
Enterprises may use performance-related pay schemes to obtain any of the fol-
lowing three main goals: performance improvement, employee selection and re-
duction of financial risk. The aim of this study is to increase our understanding of 
the usage of performance-related pay schemes in Dutch small and medium-sized 
enterprises. In particular, we examine whether firm size, ownership structure, 
and gender of the entrepreneur and employees predict the presence of perform-
ance-related pay schemes. 
 
The foundation for the theoretical framework for this study is based on agency 
theory. This theory elaborates on the basic principle that differences in the inter-
ests of different parties (principals and agents) can be aligned by means of for-
mal contracts. In addition, relevant insights from the resource based view and 
transaction cost economics are used to examine the relevance of various specific 
properties of SMEs. The resulting framework is used to derive five hypotheses 
concerned with the relationship between firm size, ownership structure, gender 
of the entrepreneur and employees, and performance-related pay. These hy-
potheses are tested by estimating logistic regression equations, with (the usage 
of) performance-related pay as the dependent variable.  
 
The results show that larger SMEs are indeed more likely to use performance-
related pay than smaller SMEs. This is in line with the first hypothesis of this 
study. 
 
We also find strong support for the presence of a gender effect. The results indi-
cate that for male entrepreneurs, the use of performance-related pay is inde-
pendent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepreneurs, 
we find that the usage of performance-related pay increases with the share of 
male employees. This relationship is such, that for firms where more than 70% 
of the workforce is male, female entrepreneurs are more likely to apply perform-
ance-related pay then male entrepreneurs. This gender effect was, however, not 
the gender effect that we expected to find. A possible explanation for the gender 
effect that we found is that female entrepreneurs are more inclined to take the 
preferences of their employees into account when they determine the compensa-
tion scheme of their enterprise. 
 
Finally, the ownership structure also seems to matter. The results suggest that 
we should differentiate between (at least) three different ownership structures: 
single-owned and managed firms, family firms (firms with multiple owners that 
have family ties between them), and multiple-owned non-family firms. Once we 
do so, we find that single-owned and managed firms are just as likely to use per-
formance-related pay schemes as family firms. Both types of firms use perform-
ance-related pay significantly less often than multiple-owned non-family firms. 
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1  Introduction 
Increased attention for performance-related pay 
Man’s income has been a central topic in research for many decades. Scholars 
ranging from philosophers to socialists, economists and lawyers have studied this 
field of research. Ideas and types of compensation evolve over time, as does the 
economy. Recently there has been a dramatic increase in the dynamics of the 
economy as a whole. Improved means of communications and transportation 
have resulted in globalization of markets. This, in turn, has led to an increased 
demand for flexibility of organisations. The implementation of new types of re-
muneration systems, namely performance-related pay schemes, is one of the in-
struments used by organisations to maintain their flexibility and ability to com-
pete (Handel and Gittleman, 2004; Lawler, 2006).  
 
The increased attention for performance-related pay schemes is illustrated by a 
recent study, that shows that the usage of performance-related pay increased 
from 25% of all Dutch enterprises (with five or more employees) in 1995 to 36% 
by 2001 (Gielen, Kerkhofs and Van Ours, 2006). Another indication of the in-
creased popularity of performance-related pay schemes is the increased number 
of agreements in collective labour agreements. The number of collective labour 
agreements that include some kind of performance-related pay scheme, rose 
from 26% in 2001 to 37% in 2004 (SZW, 2005). 
 
Objectives of performance-related pay 
Numerous studies advocate that performance-related pay improves firm per-
formance, by aligning the financial interests of employers and employees. The 
literature on this issue ranges from theoretical and empirical studies about the 
objectives, effects and consequences of performance-related pay to guidelines 
for implementation and the ethics of this type of remuneration system (Banker, 
Lee and Potter, 1996; Beer and Cannon, 2004; Thompson, 2005). For the Neth-
erlands, a recent study confirms that the implementation of performance-related 
pay in enterprises improves labour productivity (Gielen, Kerkhofs and Van Ours, 
2006).  
 
There are several objectives a firm may want to achieve by implementing a per-
formance-related pay scheme. First of all, performance-related pay can be used 
to improve individual as well as overall organisational performance (Murphy, 
1985; Abowd, 1990; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992). Individual performance may 
increase as a result of increased effort and motivation. For example, perform-
ance-related pay involving shares or option plans can be used to create a sense 
of ownership for individual employees. This may in turn increase the motivation 
or commitment of the employees (Rynes, Gerhart and Parks, 2005; Funston, 
1992; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; McCallum and Thompson, 1993). In addi-
tion, firms may use performance-related pay to communicate to current employ-
ees which aspects of the job are deemed most important. For future employees, 
performance-related pay may be a way for an organisation to distinguish itself 
from competitors (Lazear, 1986; Lazear, 2000; Trevor, Gerhart and Boudreau, 
1997). When all employees put in more effort and perform better, the organisa-
tional performance increases accordingly.  
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It has also been argued that performance-related can be used to stimulate the 
acceptance of organisational changes, such as new systems or policies (Prender-
gast, 1999; Lazear, 2004).  
 
Next, firms may implement performance-related pay to reduce company or en-
trepreneurial risk (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Bloom and Milkovich, 1998). 
By implementing performance-related pay, fixed salary-costs may be reduced 
and high variable labour-costs are incurred only in years of high results.  
 
Finally, firms may hold to the principle that it is morally right to discriminate be-
tween employees that are hired for the same job but perform differently (Ballou, 
Podgursky, 1993; Seay, 1995; Mamman, 1997).  
 
So far, little attention for determinants of performance-related pay… 
All in all, organisations may decide to implement performance-related pay for a 
variety of objectives. The actual decision whether or not to implement perform-
ance-related pay may be determined by various characteristics of the organisa-
tion, its owners and its employees. To date, hardly any research on such deter-
minants of pay-for-performance is available. This study aims to fulfil this knowl-
edge-gap. 
 
… and for the situation amongst small and medium-sized enterprises 
In addition, studies on performance-related pay also tend to ignore small and 
medium-sized enterprises. A few notable exceptions are the previously men-
tioned study by Gielen, Kerkhofs and Van Ours (2006) and the study “Dat loont!” 
by De Kok, Van Praag and Van der Sluis (2007). The latter study, which focuses 
on Dutch enterprises with 1 to 100 employees, shows that even within this sam-
ple of SMEs the usage of performance-related pay increases with firm size. This 
suggests that firm size is an important determinant of performance-related pay, 




The objective of the current study is to gain more insight into determinants of 
the usage of performance-related pay schemes in Dutch SMEs. In particular, we 
will examine whether firm size, ownership structure, and gender of the entrepre-
neur and employees predict the presence of performance-related pay schemes. 
We will derive five specific hypotheses, which will be tested empirically using the 




In the next chapter we elaborate the subject of performance-related pay: what 
does it stand for, what are the possible objectives, how is it applied in general, 
and what are the main critiques? Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework 
 
1 This suggestion is based on a simple correlation between firm size and performance-related pay. 
It does therefore not control for any other possibly relevant characteristics of the organisation, 
its owners and its employees.  
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for the current study, which is based on various insights from agency theory, the 
resource-based view and transaction cost economics. These insights are used to 
derive five hypotheses, which are presented in chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses 
the sample and methodology of the research. The final two chapters present the 
results from the statistical analysis and the main conclusions. 
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2  Performance-related pay schemes 
2.1  What does performance-related pay stand for? 
A performance-related pay scheme is a remuneration system whereby the re-
ward for an employee is partly dependent upon the employee’s own performance 
and/or on the performance of the company as a whole. The underlying idea is 
that when two people are hired for the same task, and one person substantially 
outperforms the other, this superior contribution should we rewarded financially. 
Formulated differently, performance-related pay provides the traditional “fair 
day’s pay for a fair day’s work" (LeBlanc, 1994). Survey evidence suggests that 
employers as well as employees generally support this principle (Ballou and Pod-
gursky, 1993; Seay, 1995; Mamman, 1997). Concerns exist, however, regarding 
the fairness of pay allocation decisions (Marsden and Richardson, 1994; Lowery, 
Petty and Thompson, 1996). 
 
Performance-related pay schemes exist in a variety of types, each with their own 
application or emphasis. One of the oldest and most obvious forms of perform-
ance-related pay is piece-rate compensation. This form originated from unskilled 
farm labour where monitoring costs were low and wages depended on the weight 
or the amount of pieces harvested (Lazear, 1986). Nowadays this form of per-
formance-related pay still exists in farming, but also e.g. in assembly line facto-
ries. A similar type of performance-related pay is commission-on-sales. Sales-
men whose income depends on the number of goods sold or on a percentage of 
the value of a transaction, can be considered piece-rate workers (Lazear, 1986; 
Lazear 2000).  
 
Piece-rate compensation and commission on sales are examples of outcome-
based incentive compensation schemes. Outcome-based incentive compensation 
involves relatively little managerial supervision of employees and relies on 
straightforward, objective measures of performance. Such schemes are relevant 
when firms operate in an environment that is characterized by low task pro-
grammability
1 and high outcome measurability
2 (Banker, Lee, Potter and Sriniva-
san, 1996).  
 
The merit-pay system, first discussed by Meyer (1975), uses the ‘carrot and 
stick’ principle. The best performing employees in any job qualification are re-
warded by receiving maximum allowable increases in pay. Average performers 
receive average increases, and the weakest performers receive no increase at 
all. This approach was advocated as an effective way of controlling employee be-
haviour (Meyer, 1975).  
 
 
1 Task programmability can be defined as the ability to control output quality by specifying input 
tasks that are easily observed or measured. Task programmability is high if a high correlation 
exists between specific tasks in the production process and the resulting quality attribute of in-
terest.  
2 Outcome measurability can be defined as the ease with which an outcome can be measured in a 
timely manner. If the outcome of a task is unobservable or unreliable to measure, the task is of 
low measurability.  
12   
Besides the variety of terminology and types of performance-related pay 
schemes, there is also variety in the rewards themselves. Generally, the em-
ployee’s compensation consists of a fixed and a variable part, where the variable 
part depends on performance. This dependency can be operationalised by means 
of different types of bonuses, stock option plans, share-ownership or profit shar-
ing. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the similarities and dissimi-
larities between these different types. 
2.2  Objectives of performance-related pay  
Due to the changing economic environment, more and more emphasis is being 
laid on flexibility of the organisation. Managers introduce new work practices that 
are supposed to increase employee performance, flexibility and involvement with 
organisational goals (Handel, Gittleman, 2004; Lawler, 2006). Literature on per-
formance-related pay indicates that enterprises may use performance-related 
pay schemes to obtain any of the following three main goals: performance im-
provement, employee selection and reduction of financial risk.  
 
Performance improvement 
The first and most common reason to apply performance-related pay is to moti-
vate employees to improve their effort and to improve their personal perform-
ance, resulting in an improved overall company performance. The underlying ra-
tionale is provided by agency theory, which shows that performance-related pay 
can be used to align the interests of the employer (agent) and employees (prin-
cipals). By making employee compensation dependent upon (determinants of) 
organisational performance, employees have a direct interest in improving or-
ganisation performance (Bloom and Milkovich; 1998; Prendergast, 1999; Paarsch 
and Shearer, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Beer and Cannon, 
2004; Lazear, 2004). 
 
Several longitudinal studies amongst individual managers confirm that a positive 
relationship exists between compensation, incentives and company performance. 
Murphy (1985) shows that the level of executive compensation (the sum of a 
base salary, bonus and stock options) is positively related to shareholder return 
and sales growth. Abowd (1990) researched data on more than 16.000 managers 
at 250 large corporations and found a positive relation between managerial com-
pensation (the sum of salary and bonus) and corporate performance. Another 
longitudinal research amongst 14.000 top and middle managers of 200 organisa-
tions shows that variable compensation schemes are associated with organisa-
tional financial performance while fixed compensation schemes are not (Gerhart 
and Milkovich, 1992). Finally, a field test of 15 retail outlets over 66 months on 
incentive effects of a performance-related pay scheme indicated a persistent and 
positive effect of the implementation of the performance-related pay scheme on 
firm sales (Banker, Lee and Potter, 1996). 
 
Employee selection 
Applicants in search of a new job may use available information on performance-
related pay schemes as one of the criteria in their decision on which job offer to 
accept. Organisations can take this into account and use performance-related 
pay as a selection instrument.  
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From the employee perspective, differentiation in remuneration may be desired 
to reward differences in personal performance (Helm, Holladay and Tortorella, 
2007). The idea behind this is that employees need to feel their discretionary ef-
forts do not go unrewarded. Evidence shows that high performers are likely to 
seek other employment if their performance is not sufficiently recognized by 
means of financial rewards (Trevor, Gerhart and Boudreau, 1997). This suggests 
that organisations with performance-related pay schemes may attract employees 
that believe that they perform above average. Likewise, employees that (believe 
that they) perform below average may prefer organisations without performance-
related pay schemes.  
 
Thus, an organisation may use performance-related pay to select employees who 
consider themselves to be high performers. In addition, performance-related pay 
may signal a wish for employees with an entrepreneurial spirit (Lazear, 1986). 
Finally, firms may use performance-related pay to (signal that they) believe that 
a pay scheme should discriminate between employees that are hired for the 
same job but perform differently.  
 
Reduction of financial risk  
Organisations may also use performance-related pay as a means to reduce the 
financial risk of the organisation. This is possible if employee wages are made 
(partially) dependent of the financial performance of (parts of) the organisation. 
If organisational performance drops, wage costs will also decrease, so that the 
costs are divided between the organisation and its employees. Such a pay 
scheme therefore reduces organisational risk and augments the level of risk 
borne by the employee (Bloom, Milkovich 1998).  
2.3  Design of performance-related pay schemes 
As we mentioned earlier, a wide variety of performance-related pay schemes ex-
ists. Each of these schemes has its own specific properties, with its own specific 
implications for the organisation and its management and employees. Different 
positions may require different compensation schemes. For example, sales repre-
sentatives have to perform different activities and meet different objectives than 
top managers. A reward system based on a sales commission makes sense to the 
former group, but probably not to the latter. Likewise, while the pay scheme of 
employees working in a production team may be based on the joint effort and / 
or performance of the team, the pay scheme of individually operating employees 
may be based on their personal achievements.  
 
The design and operation of performance-related pay schemes is critical for their 
success. It is beyond the scope of this study to distinguish between types of per-
formance-related pay schemes and their specific design. Instead, the discussion 
is limited to four general factors that are relevant for each performance-related 
pay scheme: goal setting, measurability of performance, alignment of strategy 
and compensation, and evaluation. 
 
Goal Setting 
Performance-related pay is tied to meeting predetermined goals. These can be 
financial, quality-related or productivity related. When these goals are set em- 
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ployees should be aware of what these goals are, and they have to feel able to 
affect the outcomes (Kauhanen and Piekkola, 2006).  
 
When these goals are not clear or perceived to be unattainable, the perform-
ance-related pay scheme actually exerts a negative influence on effort, motiva-
tion and performance. Another possible consequence of bad communication of 
goals is the perception of unfair rewards. Experience of merit pay systems is as-
sociated with doubts about the fairness of the pay allocation decisions (Marsden 
and Richardson, 1994; Lowery, 1996). Perceptions of pay unfairness are related 
to a range of negative effects for the organisation and individuals, including job 
dissatisfaction, reduced commitment, loss of trust in the organisation, depression 
and somatic complaints (Dickinson, 2006). 
 
Measurability 
The ability to measure performance is crucial for the acceptance and functioning 
of performance-related pay schemes (Belfield and Marsden, 2003; Kauhanen and 
Piekkola, 2006). In addition, employees should be aware of what the perform-
ance measures are. Case evidence on this need of awareness is provided by 
Kessler (1994).  
 
Especially when outcome measurability is high
1 and task programmability is low, 
outcome-based incentive compensation is likely to improve performance (Eisen-
hardt, 1985; Conlon and Parks, 1990; Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990; Snell, 
1992). If outcome measurability is low, not all aspects of (individual or organisa-
tional) performance can be measured easily. Introducing outcome-based incen-
tive compensation may then stimulate employees to emphasize only those as-
pects of performance that are measured and rewarded, ignoring those aspects of 
performance that are not measured. This may have a negative effect on overall 
performance (Prendergast, 1999). 
 
Evaluation  
Once the goals have been set and the performance measures have been defined, 
the results must be measured and evaluated. An evaluation of the results implies 
that employer and employee discuss the measured results, compare them to the 
original goals, and discuss possible explanations for any differences.  
 
Such an evaluation can be part of formal job evaluations. The outcomes of the 
job evaluation can be formally noted and recorded, enabling employer and em-
ployee to determine someone’s performance over time. Formal job evaluations 
may help in explaining pay differentials to employees (Dickinson, 2006). In addi-
tion, regularly held job evaluations can serve as the basis for further career de-
velopment such as promotions, selection or resignation. At the same time it 
gives the employer the possibility of coaching and (when needed) of conflict 
management (Klamer, 2005). 
 
 
1 Outcome measurability can be defined as the ease with which an outcome can be measured in a 
timely manner. If the outcome of a task is unobservable or unreliable to measure, the task is of 
low measurability.  
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Strategy and Compensation 
Finally, the association between the organisational strategy, the remuneration 
system, and the remuneration itself is important. The impact of a compensation 
system depends on the fit between the organisational context and the system 
chosen. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of performance-
related pay schemes, taking into account contingency factors such as the busi-
ness strategy and the existing human resource system (Gerhart, Minkhoff and 
Olsen, 1994; Banker, Lee and Potter, 1996). 
 
There should be a proper alignment between the organisations business strategy 
and its compensation system for the firm to continue to function effectively. In a 
study of 280 organisations across multiple industries, the alignment between or-
ganisation’s business strategy and its compensation system was associated with 
enhanced organisational effectiveness (Montemayor, 1996). Furthermore, em-
pirical evidence shows that corporate strategy is a significant predictor of pay-
package design, pay-level relative to the market and pay-administration policies 
(Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990).  
 
The reward itself also needs to be taken into account. The level of payments 
should be high enough and rewards frequent enough. Paying a small compensa-
tion may actually result in worse performance than not paying at all (Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2000). Empirical research indeed shows that payment levels below 
the median do not generate positive effects (Kauhanen and Piekkola, 2006). 
2.4  Some critical remarks on performance-related pay 
Despite the positive effects that are often attributed to performance-related pay 
schemes, various critical remarks have been raised in the past. 
 
First of all, the effects of a performance-related pay scheme for a specific or-
ganisation strongly depend on how it is designed and implemented. When this is 
not done properly, performance-related pay can have a negative effect on em-
ployees’ intrinsic motivation, their self-esteem, their motivation to participate in 
teamwork, and their creativity (Meyer, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Amabile, 
1988; Kohn, 1993; Shaw, Gupta and Delery, 2002; Beer and Katz, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, performance-related pay may motivate employees to focus exces-
sively on what is being measured. Particularly if outcome measurability is low, 
this may come at the expense of performing activities that may be just as rele-
vant for organisational performance but are not being measured. In other words, 
it may lead to dysfunctional behaviour (Prendergast, 1999). 
 
Other problems can emerge in linking performance to effort, and in linking com-
pensation to performance. Potential barriers to linking performance to effort in-
clude:  
−  difficulties in measuring performance; 
−  performance measures being strongly influenced by factors outside the control 
of those that are rewarded; 
−  managers and peers being uncomfortable with rating employees differently.  
Merit-pay systems in particular are associated with doubts about the fairness of 
the pay allocation decisions (Ballou and Podgursky, 1993; Marsden and Richard-
son, 1994; Lowery, 1996; Beer and Cannon, 2004).  
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Potential barriers to linking compensation to performance include: 
−  employees may start to rely on the additional compensation, in which case a 
substantial reduction in their (variable part of their) compensation is not eas-
ily accepted; 
−  employees tend to overestimate their own contribution to organisational per-
formance;  
−  a limited corporate budget; 
−  managers can lose commitment to the performance-related pay scheme if to-
tal wage costs exceed what was expected due to problems in payout stan-
dards (Meyer, 1975; Beer, Cannon, 2004). 
 
Earlier this chapter we discussed that enterprises may use performance-related 
pay schemes as a means to reduce the financial risk for their organisation
1. In 
contrast, the critical remarks and potential barriers indicate that the introduction 
of a performance-related pay system actually introduces a risk of its own.  
 
 
1 See section 2.2  
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3  Theoretical framework 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the current study. This 
framework consists of relevant insights from agency theory, the resource-based 
view and transaction cost economics. Agency theory provides the theoretical ra-
tionale for performance-related pay schemes: formal contract can be used to 
align the interests of principal and agent. The resource based view and transac-
tion cost economics can be used to gain additional insight concerning the rele-
vance of various characteristics that are specific for SMEs.  
 
In this chapter the relevant insights of these theories are discussed. In the next 
chapter several implications of these theories are used to derive the hypotheses 
that we will test. 
3.1  Agency theory 
Agency theory examines relationships in which one party (the principal) dele-
gates work to another party (the agent). Agency theory attempts to describe this 
relationship using the metaphor of a contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships. First, the agency problem arises when desires or goals of the prin-
cipal and agent conflict and when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to 
monitor the agent’s behaviour. The second problem arises with risk sharing, that 
is, when the principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk. The 
principal and the agent may prefer different actions while executing the work, 
because of their different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The focus of agency theory is on determining the optimal contract between the 
principal and the agent. Agency theory assumes the presence of a goal conflict 
between principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). This goal conflict introduces the 
risk of moral hazard. Moral hazard refers to the risk that the agent may not pro-
vide the level of effort that was agreed upon, in which case the agent is shirking.  
 
Outcome-based contracts, as a governance mechanism, may solve the agency-
problem by preventing opportunistic agent behaviour. The argument is that such 
contracts realign the preferences of agents and principals because the rewards 
for both depend on the same actions and therefore the conflicts of self interest 
between principal and agent are reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989). The realignment of 
the agent’s preferences with those of the principal comes at the price of transfer-
ring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the principal-agent framework can be used to 
examine employer-employee relationships as well as owner-manager relation-
ship.  
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3.2  Resource based view 
Formally, a firm’s resources at a given time are defined as those assets, tangible 
and intangible, which are linked to the firm. This includes, for example, capital, 
machinery, trade contracts, in-house knowledge of technology, skilled personnel, 
and brand names. Defined like this, resources generally refer to anything that 
could be thought of as a strength or a weakness of a firm (Wernerfelt, 1984).  
 
The resource based view is based on the assumption that differences in physical, 
organisational or human resources between firms cause a fundamental heteroge-
neity in their productive potential. Given this heterogeneity, the long term com-
petitiveness of a company depends upon the resources that not only differentiate 
it from its competitors, but are also durable and difficult to imitate and substi-
tute (De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2002). 
 
For many companies human resources are the main source of sustained competi-
tive advantage (De Kok, Uhlaner and, Thurik, 2002). Generally, human resources 
are much harder, or impossible, to imitate or substitute than physical resources. 
For most companies, maintaining a competitive advantage requires a careful 
management of human resources so that these resources remain difficult to imi-
tate and substitute, and thus, competitive. 
 
The resource based approach stresses the need for a specific HRM strategy. This 
strategy should strive for an internal fit of HRM practices, meaning that HRM 
practices should be internally consistent and reinforce each other. This strategy 
is generally associated with the application of formal HRM practices. Formal HRM 
practices are practices that are thought to stimulate employee competence and 
commitment. These practices include amongst others testing of applicants, in-
centive-pay schemes, increased emphasis on training etc (De Kok, Uhlaner and 
Thurik, 2002). 
3.3  Transaction cost economics 
Within transaction cost economics, the units of observation are individual trans-
actions. Transactions can take place either within or between firms. Transactions 
need to be coordinated and people involved must be motivated to act. Hence, 
transactions are accompanied by transaction costs. 
 
Transaction costs take the form of either coordination costs or motivation costs. 
Coordination costs within firms are the costs of transmitting information within 
the organisation. Dispersed information needs to be gathered and used to make 
plans, which then have to be communicated and implemented. However, com-
munication can never be perfect. In addition, decision makers will not be able to 
always make the optimal decision for each problem. The resulting costs are 
known as coordination costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
 
Motivation costs are caused by informational incompleteness and asymmetries 
(this occurs when parties do not have all the relevant information to determine 
whether the terms of an agreement are mutually acceptable and whether these 
terms are actually being met) and by imperfect commitment (this occurs when 
parties are unable to bind themselves to follow through on threats and prom-
ises). (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
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The specificity, frequency and uncertainty of transactions are important determi-
nants of whether and how transactions will take place. Applied to the organisa-
tion of human resources, specificity refers to the required amount of firm specific 
human capital, and uncertainty to difficulties in the measurement of individual 
output. Differences in specificity and uncertainty between firms and employees 
require different types of labour relations (De Kok, Uhlaner, Thurik, 2002). 
 
One of the insights that can be gained from transaction cost economics is that 
performance-related pay schemes can be used to reduce the motivation costs. 
This reduction occurs if the interests of the employer and employees are actually 
aligned. This reduces the risk of informational incompleteness and asymmetries 
and increases the commitment of employees to the firm. 
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4  Hypotheses 
In this chapter we derive five hypotheses in which the presence of performance-
related pay schemes is related to firm size, gender of the entrepreneur and em-
ployees, and ownership structure. 
4.1  Firm size and performance-related pay 
Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a larger 
demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and formal-
ization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require considerable 
development costs. This results in a cost-advantage for larger firms, which is 
strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms (De 
Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2002). 
 
Several studies confirm the positive influence of size on the usage of formal HRM 
practices (Kotey and Slade, 2005; De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). According 
to Nooteboom (1993), small companies often lack more sophisticated HRM pro-
grams, not because such programs are less appropriate to them, but because 
small firms lack the resources to implement such programmes. This not only re-
fers to financial resources, but also (mainly) to intangible resources such as prior 
experience and the capacity to acquire new knowledge.   
 
Performance-related pay can be considered as a formal HRM practice (de Kok, 
Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006) or a ‘high performance work practice’ (Huselid, 1995). 
Without going into details about the exact definitions, these concepts generally 
refer to HRM systems that include practices such as comprehensive employee re-
cruitment and selection procedures, incentive compensation and performance 
management systems, and extensive employee involvement and training 
(Huselid, 1995; Ramsey, Scholarios and Harley, 2000). The same properties that 
are contributed to performance-related pay apply to high performance work 
practices. These practices can improve the knowledge, skills, and abilities of a 
firm's current and potential employees, increase their motivation, reduce shirk-
ing, and enhance retention of quality employees while encouraging non-
performers to leave the firm (Jones and Wright, 1992; U.S. Department of La-
bour, 1993). 
 
Summarizing, the resource based view predicts a positive relationship between 
firm size and the use of formal HRM practices, including the application of per-
formance-related pay. 
 
Second, according to transaction cost economics, choices regarding HRM prac-
tices are made by employers (agents) whose rationality is bounded. When ra-
tionality is bounded, it becomes relevant to know where the limited attention of 
employers is directed at. For small firms, the perspective from which external 
scanning is performed is often dominated, and thereby restricted, by the per-
sonal perspective of the entrepreneur (De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2002).  
 
The personal perspective of the entrepreneur is influenced by the size of the 
firm. Research shows that within small firms pay determination is often not pur- 
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sued in a systematic manner (Fuller-Love and Scapens, 1997) and employees of-
ten receive basic pay independent of performance (Koch and van Straten, 1997; 
Risseeuw, Balk and Van der Kaaden, 1999). Small business owners often con-
sider performance-related pay as a last resort for motivating personnel (Ram, 
1999). Thus, transaction cost economics also predicts a positive relationship be-
tween firm size and the use of performance-related pay. 
 
Thirdly, according to agency theory larger firms have more need for governance 
mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. In larger firms, shirking is 
less easy to detect, which increases the risk that shirking will actually occur 
(Chang, 2006). Outcome-based contracts may reduce the risk of shirking by re-
moving (or reducing) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer 
and employees. Therefore, it is expected that larger firms will make more use of 
performance-related pay. 
 
In sum, all three theories support the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firm size is positively related to the usage of performance-related pay. 
4.2  Gender and performance-related pay 
4.2.1 Gender of the entrepreneur 
According to agency theory, the realignment of the agent’s preferences with 
those of the principal comes at the price of transferring risk to the agent. In 
other words, outcome based contracts, like performance-related pay, can be 
used to transfer some of the entrepreneurial risk to the employees.  
 
Female entrepreneurs are known to be more risk averse than men (ENSR 1996; 
Verheul and Thurik, 2001). This suggests that female entrepreneurs are more 
likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees, by making use 
of performance-related pay. 
 
According to Verheul (2003), female entrepreneurs also differ from their male 
counterparts in that they are more likely to use formal HRM practices. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands. She distinguishes between commitment and control oriented man-
agement. The higher the degree to which procedures and regulation are formal-
ized, the higher the degree of control over employees and the production process 
is. She finds that female-led firms have a more control-oriented type of HRM 
than male-led firms. This result implies that female entrepreneurs can be associ-
ated with a higher degree of formalization, which is associated with a higher us-
age of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains  
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that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes, and we arrive at the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Firms with female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than firms with male entrepreneurs. 
4.2.2 Gender of employees 
In chapter two we discussed that performance-related pay can stimulate both the 
inflow of employees that are likely to perform above average (selection at the 
gate), and the outflow of employees that perform below average (internal selec-
tion).  
 
In addition, and apart from any differences in performance, the presence of per-
formance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Likewise, the 
introduction of performance-related pay may stimulate the outflow of female 
employees. This would be caused by the fact that men tend to be less risk averse 
than women (ENSR, 1996). Performance-related pay raises the risk borne by the 
employee, which suggests that male employees may have a more positive atti-
tude regarding performance-related pay. This is supported empirically by Doh-
men and Falk (2001). They find that 68% of the 119 male participants prefer a 
variable pay compared to only 44% of the 121 women. They further show that 
women are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference 
explains their attitude towards variable pay. This implies that organisations that 
use performance-related pay will have a higher share of male employees. Hence, 
the gender of the employees can actually be used as a predictor of performance-
related pay:   
 
H3: The percentage of male employees is positively related to the usage of per-
formance-related pay. 
4.3  Ownership and performance-related pay 
For this study we distinguish between two different ownership characteristics. 
The first characteristic is the number of owners. Based on this characteristic, we 
distinguish between single-owned and managed firms and multiple-owned firms. 
The second characteristic is only relevant for multiple-owned firms: whether the 
owners are related to each other or not.  
Single-owned firms 
Generally speaking, organisations with a single owner-manager tend to have less 
hierarchy, to be more flexible and to have relatively short communicational lines 
(Hankinson, Bartlet and Ducheneaut, 1997). Since the owner of the firm can di-
rectly control all activities, there is less need for formal control mechanisms and 
performance appraisal can remain informal and continuous (Mintzberg, Quinn 
and Voyer, 1995). In organisations where ownership and management do not co-
incide, the owner(s) are more likely to introduce formal control mechanisms. We 
therefore expect that firms where the owner and general manager are one and 
the same person (i.e., single owned-managed firms) will be less inclined to use 
formal control mechanisms than enterprises where ownership and management 
do not coincide.  
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In addition, it has been argued that owner-managers may lack the necessary re-
sources to implement performance-related pay. If owners hire (general) manag-
ers, it is likely that the selection will be based (amongst others) on the manage-
rial skills and experience of the candidates (including their HRM skills). This does 
not apply to single owned-managed firms. It can therefore be suggested that 
owner-managers are more likely to lack the skills necessary to carry out effective 
performance reviews. Instead, they are more likely to perceive formal perform-
ance appraisal systems as time consuming (MacMahon and Murphy, 1999). In 
addition, single owner-managers are reported to have difficulties in trusting em-
ployees and are reluctant to delegate work. This leaves single owner-managers 
too busy to devote time to strategic roles (Kotey and Slade, 2005).  
 
In sum, it can be argued that single owned-managed firms may have less need 
for, and be less equipped for, performance-related pay schemes. This argument 
is formalized in the fourth hypothesis of this study: 
 
H4: Firms with a single owner-manager are less likely to use performance-
related pay than other firms. 
Family-owned firms 
In this study, we define family-owned firms as firms with multiple owners, where 
family ties exist between at least two of the owners. By definition, family-owned 
firms are multiple-owned firms. 
 
Family-owned firms often want to remain independent, with their owners wanting 
to keep full control over the organisation. Employers often associate formaliza-
tion of HRM practices with a loss of control. It is therefore not surprising that De 
Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik (2006) found that family-owned firms tend to make less 
use of formal HRM practices than non-family firms (controlling for differences in 
firm size). Since performance-related pay schemes can be considered as a formal 
HRM practice, we expect that family-owned firms will make less use of perform-
ance-related pay. Accordingly, the final hypothesis reads: 
 
H5: Family-owned firms are less likely to use of performance-related pay than 
other multiple-owned firms.  
  25 
5  Sample and methodology 
For the empirical part of this study, we use the same data that has also been 
used in De Kok, Van Praag and Van der Sluis (2007). The first section of this 
chapter provides a brief discussion of this sample
1. The next section discusses 
how we use this sample to test our hypotheses. 
5.1  Sample 
Questionnaire 
De Kok, Van Praag and Van der Sluis (2007) used a questionnaire and a tele-
phone survey to obtain the required data. The questionnaire was based on ex-
pertise of the authors as well as results of previous questionnaires. The concept 
questionnaire was tested through several test interviews. This resulted in a few 
adjustments in the formulation of the questions.  
Stratification and sample size 
The survey targeted Dutch private enterprises with 1 to 100 employees, from all 
sectors and age classes. The sample was stratified by size, sector and age. Close 
to 770 enterprises were contacted that fell within the stratification plan
2, and al-
most 50% of these participated and completed the interview.  
Telephone survey 
The sample has been collected by means of a telephone survey which took place 
in June and July 2006. The questions were answered by the independent entre-
preneurs (in case of a single-owned firm), the major business partner (in case of 
a partnership with unlimited liability
3), or by the general director (in other legal 
structures). Unless stated differently, we use the term ‘entrepreneur’ to indicate 
the respondent of the questionnaire, irrespective of the legal form and the own-
ership structure.  
5.2  Methodology 
5.2.1 Logistic Regression 
The five hypotheses that we want to test, relate firm size, gender characteristics 
and ownership structure to performance-related pay. Performance-related pay is 
measured as a dichotomous variable, indicating whether or not an organisation 
employs performance-relate pay schemes for (part of) its employees. To take ac-




1 More details can be found in De Kok, Van Praag and Van der Sluis (2007). 
2 In total, 2.363 enterprises were phoned. In 1.057 cases it was not possible to contact the entre-
preneur, and 539 enterprises fell outside the stratification plan (e.g. having no employees or 
more than 100). 
3 Vennootschap onder Firma.  
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5.2.2  Dependent and independent variables  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the usage of performance-related pay. 
Performance-related pay is defined as a compensation scheme were at least part 
of the remuneration of employees depends upon individual and/or organisational 
performance. Performance-related pay can include various instruments or com-
ponents, such as bonuses, gratuities, or profit sharing schemes. In 2005, ap-
proximately 25% of all Dutch SMEs employed some kind of performance-related 
pay for at least some of their employees (Figure 1). 




  Source: ACE and EIM, beloningsonderzoek 2006; weighted results 
Independent variables 
Firm size is measured as the number of employees. Often, relative differences in 
firm size are more important than absolute differences. For example, firms with 
20 employees are likely to differ in many respects from firms with 5 employees, 
but this does not hold for firms with 1.020 or 1.005 employees (even though in 
both cases the difference is 15 employees). We take account of this effect by in-
cluding the logarithm of firm size as an independent variable in the regression.  
 
The gender of the entrepreneur is represented by a dummy variable ‘female en-
trepreneur’, which indicates whether or not the entrepreneur is female. The 
sample includes 51 female entrepreneurs, which accounts for 14% of the sample. 
This share is considerably lower than the reported 30% of female entrepreneurs 
in the western world (OECD, 1998). Assuming that female entrepreneurs are less 
likely to have employees than males, the difference may be explained by the fact 
that our sample excludes firms without employees. 
 
The sample contains information about the total number of employees, and 
about the number of male employees. By combining these two variables the 
share of male employees can be calculated. This variable is used to represent the 
gender composition of the workforce. It is not unconceivable that the strength of 
the relationship between the share of male employees and performance-related 
pay will differ between firms with male and female entrepreneurs. We may con-
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crossterm is calculated as the product of the variables ‘female entrepreneur’ and 
the share of male employees. 
 
In this study we distinguish between two different ownership characteristics: the 
number of owners and the presence of family ties between owners. Conse-
quently, we want to be able to differentiate between three different ownership 
structures: firms with a single owner-manager, firms with multiple owners with 
family ties between them, and firms with multiple owners without family ties be-
tween them
1. In order to identify these three groups and test the associated hy-
potheses, we use three different dummy variables.  
 
The first variable is ‘single-owned’, which indicates whether or not the firm has a 
single owner-manager. The second variable is ‘family-owned’ which indicates 
whether or not at least two of the owners (of a firm with multiple owners) are 
connected by family ties. In order to test the fifth hypothesis, this variable is 
only defined for multiple-owned firms
2. The third variable is ‘multiple owned’, 
which indicates whether or not a firm has multiple owners that are not connected 
by family ties. This variable is defined for all firms, which means that it can be 
used to compare multiple owned non-family firms with the other two ownership 
structures.  
 
If both hypotheses regarding the ownership structures (H4 and H5) would be 
true, then the variable ‘multiple-owned’ should have a significant relationship 
with the usage of performance-related pay: hypothesis H4 indicates that single-
owned and managed firms are less likely to use performance-related pay than 
multiple-owned firms, while hypothesis H5 indicates that within the group of 
multiple-owned firms, family firms are less likely to use performance-related pay 
than non-family firms.  
 
If ownership structure would be closely related with firm size, it would be very 
difficult to differentiate empirically between the effects of firm size and owner-
ship structure. As it turns out, the average firm size in our sample is independ-
ent of the ownership structure (Table 1), so the data allows us to differentiate 
between these different hypotheses. 
 
 
1 The sample contains three firms that represent a fourth ownership structure: firms with a single 
owner where the owner is not the manager. These firms are excluded from further analyses. 
2  The fifth hypothesis is about the relevance of family ties for multiple-owned firms. If this hy-
pothesis would be tested using a sample that includes single-owned firms, it would be difficult to 
differentiate it from the fourth hypothesis (which compares single-owned and managed firms 
with multiple-owned firms).   
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Table 1  Average firm size by ownership structure 
Ownership structure  Average firm size   Number of observations 
Single-owned and managed firms  22  168 
Multiple-owned family firms  24  76 
Multiple-owned non-family firms  25  95 
Total  24  339 
  Source: ACE and EIM, beloningsonderzoek 2006 
5.2.3 Control variables 
Firm age 
Organisations have both a legal age and an economic age. The legal age is the 
age of the current legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is regis-
tered at the Chamber of Commerce. An organisation’s economic age indicates 
how long the firm has been economically active. De Kok, Van Praag and Van der 
Sluis (2007) show that the legal and economic age of firms will often differ. Us-
ing only three age categories
1 they find that for about half of the population of 
Dutch SMEs, the legal age falls in a different age category than the economic 
age. If the age categories differ, it is mostly the case that the economic age ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time.  
 




Sector is often used as a control variable in economic studies. In the case of our 
sample, information about the sector is missing for about one third of the obser-
vations. Including sector dummies as control variables will therefore result in a 
substantial reduction of the number of valid observations. Our main analyses are 
therefore conducted without sector dummies; regression results including sector 
dummies are included in the annex.  
 
Function suitability and management capability 
Function suitability indicates to which extent the respondent believes that most 
of the positions within their organisation are suitable for performance-related 
pay. Management capability indicates to which extent the respondent believes 
that the management of the organisation is capable of measuring individual em-
ployee performance. Both variables are measured on a five-point scale. We ex-
pect that both variables will be positively related with the presence of perform-
ance-related pay. Since the causality between these variables is not clear
2, we 
only include them as control variables. 
 
 
1 0 to 3 years, 4 to 7 years and 8 years or more. 
2 Firms that use performance-related pay are more likely to score high on function suitability and 
management capability, if only to justify the introduction of performance-related pay.  
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6  Results 
Two models have been estimated to test our hypotheses. The first model is esti-
mated for the whole sample, which includes single-owned as well as multiple-
owned firms. This model can be used to test hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4. The 
fifth hypothesis compares two different groups of multiple-owned firms (family-
firms versus multiple-firms). This hypothesis cannot be tested in a model that 
also includes single-owned firms, because this would make it very difficult to dif-
ferentiate it from the fourth hypothesis. We have therefore estimated a second 
model, using only observations from multiple-owned firms. The results of both 
models can be found in Table 2 .  
Table 2  Results of Logistic Regression on the presence of performance-related pay, for 
different populations 
  Population examined 
Independent variables  Single-owned and multiple-
owned firms 
Multiple-owned firms only 
Ln (size)                            .49 (.00)*                            .43 (.01)** 
Female entrepreneur                           -.91 (.08)                           -.78 (.22) 
Share of male employees                             .01 (.32)                            .01 (.17) 
Single-owned                            -.39 (.18)   
Family-owned                             -.63 (.17) 
Log age                             .00 (.99)                            .07 (.69) 
Management capability                             .25 (.21)                            .02 (.93) 
Function suitability                             .54 (.00)*                            .46 (.01)* 
Constant                          -4.57 (.00)*                         -3.50 (.02)** 
     
Goodness of Fit Measures     
Cox & Snell R
2                             .17                              .18 
Nagelkerke R
2                             .24                              .24 
-2 Log likelihood                        297                          158 
% Predicted Correctly                          71.4
A                           67.1
B 
Chi
2 test statistic                          52.3 (.00)*                           27.4 (.00)* 
Valid Observations                        273                          140 
  *   significant at 99% confidence level  
  **   significant at 95% confidence level 
  A Value for the empty model = 66.3% 
  B Value for the empty model = 62.1% 
The presented goodness-of-fit statistics indicate that both models increase our 
understanding of performance-related pay. The highly significant values of the 
Chi
2 test show that both models performs better than the empty model (which  
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includes no independent variables). The models also provide a better prediction 
of which firms use performance-related pay than the empty model. 
 
Despite these overall statistics, only one of the relevant independent variables 
differs significantly from zero: firm size. In both models, firm size has a signifi-
cantly positive relation with the usage of performance-related pay. Larger firms 
are indeed more likely to use performance-related pay than smaller firms. The 
other hypotheses are rejected: if we correct for firm size, none of the variables 
related to gender and ownership structure have a significant relationship with 
performance-related pay.  
 
A possible explanation for this lack of significant results is that the underlying 
relationships are more complex than we originally assumed. To examine if this is 
the case, we included the gender crossterm and the variable ‘family owned’ in 
the models and re-estimated them. The results of this analysis can be found in 
Table 3.  
 
Again, the presented goodness-of-fit statistics indicate that both models are sig-
nificant. More importantly, the R
2–statistics and the % predicted correctly all in-
dicate that they perform better than the models presented in Table 2. 
 
Firm size positively related with performance-related pay 
Just as in the previous models, we find a significant positive effect of firm size. 
Moreover, the estimated parameters are very similar across the five estimated 
models (ranging between 0.43 and 0.50), which suggests that these results are 
fairly robust. Larger firms are more likely to use performance-related pay, even 
if we control for differences in gender, ownership structure and economic age of 
the organisation. 
 
The gender composition of the workforce does not matter for male en-
trepreneurs… 
Once we introduce the gender crossterm in the model, we find support for the 
presence of a gender effect. The results indicate that for male entrepreneurs, the 
use of performance-related pay is independent of the gender composition of the 
workforce. This follows from the observations that for male entrepreneurs the 
gender crossterm is zero
1, as is the parameter for ‘share of male employees’. 
 
… but it does for female entrepreneurs 
For female entrepreneurs, the picture is different. We find a highly negative pa-
rameter for the variable ‘female entrepreneur’ and at the same time a positive 
parameter for the gender crossterm. The first parameter indicates that, in firms 
with a low share of male employees (so that the gender crossterm is close to 
zero), female entrepreneurs are very unlikely to use performance-related pay. 
The second parameter indicates that for female entrepreneurs, the use of per-
formance-related pay is related to the gender composition of the workforce: an 
increasing share of male employees is associated with an increased usage of per-
formance-related pay.  
 
1 This crossterm is defined as the product of the variables ‘female entrepreneur’ and ‘share of 
male employees’; for male entrepreneurs, the first variable is zero.   
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Table 3  Results of Logistic Regression on the presence of performance-related pay, for 
different populations 
  Population examined 
Independent variables  Single-owned and multiple-owned firms  Multiple-owned firms 
only 
Ln (size)            .50 (.00)*           .48 (.00)*             .46 (.01)** 
Female entrepreneur         -4.97 (.01)**        -4.92 (.01)**          -6.79 (.05)*** 
Share of male employees            .00 (.98)          -.00 (.87)             .00 (.78) 
Gender crossterm            .07 (.01)**           .07 (0.01)**             .09 (.03)** 
Single-owned           -.39 (.12)     
Multiple-owned             .67 (.04)***   
Family-owned                -.64 (.16) 
Log age           -.03 (.83)           .05 (.72)             .04 (.85) 
Management capability            .22 (.26)           .26 (.20)            -.02 (.95) 
Function suitability            .55 (.00)*           .54 (.00)*             .47 (.01)* 
Constant         -4.17 (.00)*        -4.79 (.00)*          -2.86 (.01)* 
       
Goodness of Fit Measures       
Cox & Snell R
2             0.21                .21                 .23 
Nagelkerke R
2             0.29                .30                 .32 
-2 Log likelihood          286           283             148 
% Predicted Correctly            71.8
A             72.2
A               68.6
B 
Chi
2 test statistic            36.2 (.00)*             65.7 (.00)*               37.3 (.00)* 
Valid Observations          273           273             140 
  *   significant at 99% confidence level  
  **   significant at 95% confidence level 
  A Value for the empty model = 66.3% 
B Value for the empty model = 62.1% 
 
These gender effects are illustrated in Figure 2, for the case of multiple-owned, 
non-family firms. It shows that in companies with a high share of male employ-
ees, female entrepreneurs are more likely to apply performance-related pay than 
male entrepreneurs. In companies with a moderate-to-high share of female em-
ployees, female entrepreneurs are less likely to apply performance-related pay 
than their male counterparts. 
 
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that female entrepreneurs are 
more willing to take the preferences of their employees into account. Male em-
ployees tend to be less risk-averse than female employees, and therefore more 
often prefer performance-related pay. If entrepreneurs were to take account of 
these preferences, we would expect to find a positive relationship between the 
share of male employees and the use of performance-related pay, which is ex-
actly what we found for female entrepreneurs.  
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Figure 2  Relationship between probability of using performance-related pay and share of 




However, it should be noted that the subsample on which this analysis is based, 
includes only 36 female entrepreneurs, of which only eight are managing a work-
force with more than 70% males.  
 
Single-owned and managed firms comparable to family firms 
Each of the three models in Table 3 includes a different indicator of ownership 
structure. Neither the variable ‘single-owned’ nor the variable ‘family-owned’ has 
a significant effect, which means that we still cannot accept hypotheses H4 and 
H5. However, the variable ‘multiple-owned’, which indicates multiple-owned non-
family firms, does have a significant and positive relationship with the usage of 
performance-related pay. This indicates that ownership structure is indeed re-
lated to the usage of performance-related pay, although in a different way than 
we expected. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates for each of the three ownership structures how the probability 
of using performance-related pay increases with firm size. This figure clearly il-
lustrates that multiple-owned non-family firms are more likely to use perform-
ance-related pay than any of the other firms that we considered. It also shows 
that single-owned and family-owned firms behave very similar in this respect. 
This could explain why we found no support for hypothesis H4. This hypothesis 
compares single-owned firms to all multiple-owned firms, which includes family-
owned firms.  
 
The fact that we find no support for hypothesis H5 may be due to the relatively 
small sample that is available to test this hypothesis (only 140 firms, which is 
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Figure 3  Relationship between probability of using performance-related pay and firm 






Firm age and management capability do not seem to be useful predictors of per-
formance-related pay. Function suitability is highly significant. This might illus-
trate the intuitive expectation that firms who regard their functions to be suit-
able for performance-related pay, are more likely to actually use performance-
related pay. This finding would, however, also result if firms that have perform-
ance-related pay are biased toward answering that their functions are indeed 
suitable for performance-related pay. One could therefore argue that this vari-
able (just as management capability) should be excluded from the model. If we 
do so, we find that the values, signs, and significance levels of the other vari-


























single-owned family-owned multiple-owned 
  35 
7  Conclusion 
Organisations may use performance-related pay schemes in order to improve in-
dividual and organisational performance, to improve the recruitment, selection 
and retention policy, and to reduce the financial risk of the organisation. The ac-
tual decision to use performance-related pay may be determined by various 
characteristics of the organisation, its owners and its employees. Little is known, 
however, about the relevance of these determinants. This holds a forteriori for 
small and medium-sized enterprises. With this study we aim to increase our un-
derstanding of such determinants amongst SMEs. We do so by examining 
whether firm size, ownership structure, and gender of the entrepreneur and em-
ployees predict the presence of performance-related pay schemes. 
 
As the results show, larger SMEs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than smaller SMEs. This is in line with the first hypothesis of this study. 
 
We also found a gender effect. This effect differs, however, from what we ex-
pected based on our theoretical framework. The results indicate that for male 
entrepreneurs, the use of performance-related pay is independent of the gender 
composition of the work force. This indicates that the rationale underlying hy-
pothesis H3 is not correct. This rationale assumed that the presence of perform-
ance-related pay schemes would stimulate the inflow of male applicants. This ar-
gument is independent of the gender of the entrepreneur, which is not supported 
by the results of our study. 
 
For female entrepreneurs, we find that the usage of performance-related pay in-
creases with the share of male employees. This relationship is such, that female 
entrepreneurs are more likely to apply performance-related pay, only if more 
than 70% of their workforce is male. This rejects hypothesis H2, which states 
that female entrepreneurs are always more likely to apply performance-related 
pay. Again, this suggests that the underlying rationale is not correct: there is no 
indication that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay in order to relocate part of the financial risk of the organisation towards the 
employees. 
 
How should we then explain the gender effect that we found? A possible explana-
tion is that female entrepreneurs are more inclined to take the preferences of 
their employees into account when they determine the compensation scheme of 
their enterprise. 
 
The ownership structure is the final predictor of performance-related pay that we 
examined. The two hypotheses that we formulated were both rejected, but the 
results suggest that this is because we did not distinguish properly between the 
three relevant ownership structures. Once we do so, by differentiating between 
multiple-owned non-family firms on the one hand, and family firms and single-
owned and managed firms on the other hand, we find that both single-owned 
and managed firms and family firms are less likely to use performance-related 
pay than multiple-owned non-family firms. The results also show that single-
owned and managed firms resemble family firms in this respect.  
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ANNEX I  Logistic regressions including sector informa-
tion      
Table 4 presents the results of logistic regressions of two models, with and with-
out the available sector information. The Chi
2 test statistics indicates that the in-
clusion of the sector dummies does not significantly improve the models. This is 
in line with the finding that none of the included sector dummies differ signifi-
cantly from zero. At the same time, including sector information substantially 
diminished the number of valid observations.  
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Table 4  Results of Logistic Regression on the presence of performance-related pay, for 
different populations, with and without sector dummies 
  Population examined 
Independent variables  Single-owned and multiple-owned 
firms 
Multiple-owned firms only 
Ln (size)             .49 (.00)*              .54 (.00)*           .43 (.01)**            .465 (.03)** 
Female entrepreneur            -.91 (.08)           -1.20 (.06)          -.78 (.22)         -1.44 (.10) 
Share of male employees             .01 (.32)              .00 (.74)           .01 (.17)            .01 (.24) 
Single-owned            -.39 (.18)             -.26 (.45)     
Family-owned              -.63 (.17)           -.46 (.45) 
Log age             .00 (.99)              .10 (.48)           .07 (.69)            .16 (.45) 
Management capability             .25 (.21)              .10 (.68)           .02 (.93)           -.24 (.43) 
Function suitability             .54 (.00)*              .56 (.00)*           .46 (.01)*            .48 (.03) 
Sector dummies         
Construction               -.65 (.33)             -.97 (.29) 
Automotive               -.03 (.98)           20.34 (.99) 
Wholesale                .74 (.25)             -.70 (.59) 
Retail               -.65 (.29)              .44 (.61) 
Transport and communica-
tion 
             -.94 (.38)          -20.8 (.99) 
Service                .59 (.25)              .69 (.32) 
Catering                .14 (.82)              .43 (.65) 
Constant          -4.57 (.00)*           -4.46 (.00)*        -3.50 (.02)**         -3.31 (.10) 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Cox & Snell R
2              .17              .22           .18            .25 
Nagelkerke R
2              .24              .30           .24            .38 
-2 Log likelihood          297         235       158       118 
% Predicted Correctly           71.4
B           71.2
A         67.1
D         71.6
C 
Chi
2 test statistic           52.3 (.00)*           10.1 (.18)         27.4 (.00)*           8.6 (.28) 
Valid Observations         273         229       140        116 
  *   significant at 99% confidence level  
  **   significant at 95% confidence level 
  A Value for the empty model = 66.8% 
  B Value for the empty model = 66.3% 
  C Value for the empty model = 63.8% 
D Value for the empty model = 62.1%  
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